Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing.

The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.

Hygiene audit in textile industry facilities against Covid-19 / Auditoria de higiene en instalaciones de la industria textil frente al Covid-19

Los trabajadores de la industria están expuestos a distintos tipos de riesgos, incluyendo la exposición laboral a agentes biológicos como virus, bacterias, hongos, parásitos, esporas o toxinas capaces de originar algún tipo de infección, enfermedad o toxicidad. Gran variedad de estos patógenos ha sido identificada sobre distintas superficies dentro de instalaciones de trabajo, persistiendo en algunos casos luego de las jornadas de limpieza habituales, e incluso sobreviviendo por largos períodos de tiempo. Los hallazgos preliminares indican que los procesos de higiene en dos industrias permitieron disminuir de manera estadísticamente significativa la presencia de E. Coli y Sars-Cov-2, en las superficies dentro de las instalaciones. Por el contrario, en una tercera industria se observó que los procesos de higiene y limpieza no lograron reducir eficazmente la presencia de los patógenos La auditoría de higiene en instalaciones de industrias textiles debe incluir la capacidad de hallar e identificar los peligros biológicos que aún estén presentes en superficies, una vez ejecutados los protocolos rutinarios de limpieza y desinfección establecidos por la organización. Para esta labor proponemos la práctica complementaria de tres procedimientos: la determinación microbiológica, mediante torundas o placas de contacto, la determinación visual con luz ultravioleta, para comprobar el grado de eficacia de la limpieza, y la determinación específica, consistente en la detección de ARN de virus SARS-CoV-2 (causante del COVID-19) en muestras ambientales de superficies por el método de PCR en tiempo real(AU)

Industrial workers are exposed to different types of risks, including occupational exposure to biological agents such as viruses, bacteria, fungi, parasites, spores or toxins capable of causing some type of infection, disease or toxicity. A great variety of these pathogens have been identified on different surfaces within work facilities, persisting in some cases after the usual cleaning days, and even surviving for long periods of time. Preliminary findings indicate that hygiene processes in two industries allowed a statistically significant decrease in the presence of E. Coli and Sars-Cov-2, on surfaces within the facilities. On the contrary, in a third industry it was observed that hygiene and cleaning processes failed to effectively reduce the presence of pathogens Hygiene audit in textile industry facilities should include the ability to find and identify biological hazards that are still present on surfaces, once the routine cleaning and disinfection protocols established by the organization have been executed. For this work, we propose the complementary practice of three procedures: microbiological determination, using swabs or contact plates, visual determination with ultraviolet light, to verify the degree of cleaning efficiency, and specific determination, consisting of RNA detection. of SARS-CoV-2 virus (causing COVID-19) in environmental samples of surfaces by the real-time PCR method(AU)

Rescue medical activities among sea migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean region: lessons to be learned from the 2014-2020 period.

BACKGROUND: Since 2014, the number of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean towards Europe has risen significantly due to various reasons. Both state agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have launched rescue missions in the Central Mediterranean in accordance with international legal obligations for search and rescue (SAR) operations for those under distress at sea. Our aim is to summarise the specific qualifications needed for maritime SAR in the Mediterranean both in terms of the population at risk, the equipment and the medical support required, especially during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic and the operational legal framework. MATERIALS AND METHODS: This article aims to summarise the key points of SAR efforts from a medical perspective as depicted in the relevant literature during a specific timeline period (2014-2020) in a specific part of the Mediterranean Sea (Central Mediterranean route). Only papers published in English and whose full text was available were included in this study. The inclusion criteria were: a) articles referring to sea rescue operations between 2014 and 2020, b) research that focused on medical preparedness and assistance during rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean route, c) studies concerning demographic and clinical features of the rescue population, d) guidelines on the rule of conduct of persons and states participating in rescue activities. The exclusion criteria were: a) studies describing SAR operations in different regions of the world and b) studies focusing on routes, demographics and medical support of migrants/refugees on land. RESULTS: Three major themes were identified: a) characteristics of the population in distress at sea: country of origin, age groups, presence of communicable and non-communicable diseases were identified in the relevant literature. Our research shows that dermatological and respiratory issues were the major concerns among sea migrants, coming from different countries of both Africa and Asia, being relatively young and mostly males; b) medical preparedness and equipment needed for rescue: according to current guidelines, revised during the COVID-19 pandemic, infrastructure needed during SAR operations includes both equipment for resuscitation, personal protective equipment, deck adjustments, medical personnel trained to function in an austere setting and able to handle vulnerable patient groups such as children and pregnant women; c) medico-legal implications of SAR operations: knowledge of the legal framework encompassing SAR operations seems necessary, as European Union and state led initiatives seem to withdraw from proactive SAR, while criminalising NGO led rescue efforts. Operating with the imperative to save lives seems to be the only way of respecting international law and human values, thus, a summary of what the law dictates was made in an effort to keep medical workers participating in such operations updated. CONCLUSIONS: Investigation aims to shed light on the special clinical features of sea migrants, the skills, equipment and organizational structure needed by medical workers participating in SAR operations as well as the legal framework under which they will be asked to operate. Special consideration will be given to the difficulties that emerged due to the COVD-19 pandemic.

COVID-19: Opportunity to Re-Imagine Our Response to a National Medical Crisis.

The US is facing the most significant health challenge since the 1918-1919 flu pandemic. A response commensurate with this challenge requires engaged leadership and organization across private and public sectors that span federal agencies, public and private healthcare systems, professional organizations, and industry. In the trauma and emergency care communities, we have long discussed the tension between competition in healthcare and the need for regional cooperation to respond to large-scale disasters. The response to COVID-19 has required unprecedented coordination of private and public sector entities. Given the competitive nature of the US health system, these sectors do not regularly work together despite the requirement to do so during a national emergency. This crisis has exposed how structural aspects of the present healthcare system have limited our ability to rapidly transition to a whole-nation response during a national crisis. We propose a renewed focus on the intersection of the healthcare system and national security, with the express goal of creating a public-private partnership focused on leveraging our healthcare infrastructure to support the national security interests of the US.

[Contribution of a hospital pharmacy team to critical care of patients infected with SARS-CoV-2]. / Contribution d'une équipe de pharmacie hospitalière à la prise en charge en réanimation des patients infectés par le SARS-CoV-2.

With regard to the hospital drug supply chain, the safest system is the individual automated drug dispensing one provided by the pharmacy. For several years we have been trying to convince hospital decision-makers to set it up. In the meantime, to mitigate the risks of medication errors incurred by patients and caregivers, we have set up several work teams within the care units. These teams, made up of one pharmacist and one or two hospital pharmacy technicians, who notably manage the medicine cabinets in care units. The close collaboration with doctors and nurses developed over the years was a determining factor when it became necessary to provide the newly created additional intensive care units with drugs and medical devices (MDs) in order to cope with the crisis triggered by the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic. Daily monitoring of the drugs consumed by each patient, particularly neuromuscular blocking agents and MDs was a key element in managing stocks and anticipating changes of drugs, packaging and/or devices references. These facts give weight to the Claris report published in France which recognizes that the interactions of pharmacy technicians and pharmacists in the care units have positive effects in terms of quality and safety of patient care. They highlight the dangers to which patients and caregivers are exposed on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays when the pharmacy is closed. They legitimize the question of extending the opening of the pharmacy with a full team 365 days a year.

Validation analysis of Global Health Security Index (GHSI) scores 2019.

INTRODUCTION: The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully demonstrates the consequences of biothreats. Countries will want to know how to better prepare for future events. The Global Health Security Index (GHSI) is a broad, independent assessment of 195 countries' preparedness for biothreats that may aid this endeavour. However, to be useful, the GHSI's external validity must be demonstrated. We aimed to validate the GHSI against a range of external metrics to assess how it could be utilised by countries. METHODS: Global aggregate communicable disease outcomes were correlated with GHSI scores and linear regression models were examined to determine associations while controlling for a number of global macroindices. GHSI scores for countries previously exposed to severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome and Ebola and recipients of US Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) investment were compared with matched control countries. Possible content omissions in light of the progressing COVID-19 pandemic were assessed. RESULTS: GHSI scores for countries had strong criterion validity against the Joint External Evaluation ReadyScore (rho=0.82, p<0.0001), and moderate external validity against deaths from communicable diseases (-0.56, p<0.0001). GHSI scores were associated with reduced deaths from communicable diseases (F(3, 172)=22.75, p<0.0001). The proportion of deaths from communicable diseases decreased 4.8% per 10-point rise in GHSI. Recipient countries of the GHSA (n=31) and SARS-affected countries (n=26), had GHSI scores 6.0 (p=0.0011) and 8.2 (p=0.0010) points higher than matched controls, respectively. Biosecurity and biosafety appear weak globally including in high-income countries, and health systems, particularly in Africa, are not prepared. Notably, the GHSI does not account for all factors important for health security. CONCLUSION: The GHSI shows promise as a valid tool to guide action on biosafety, biosecurity and systems preparedness. However, countries need to look beyond existing metrics to other factors moderating the impact of future pandemics and other biothreats. Consideration of anthropogenic and large catastrophic scenarios is also needed.

The value proposition of the Global Health Security Index.

Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to human health and security. Countries with robust capacities for preventing, detecting and responding to outbreaks can avert many of the social, political, economic and health system costs of such crises. The Global Health Security Index (GHS Index)-the first comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across 195 countries-recently found that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics or pandemics. The GHS Index can help health security stakeholders identify areas of weakness, as well as opportunities to collaborate across sectors, collectively strengthen health systems and achieve shared public health goals. Some scholars have recently offered constructive critiques of the GHS Index's approach to scoring and ranking countries; its weighting of select indicators; its emphasis on transparency; its focus on biosecurity and biosafety capacities; and divergence between select country scores and corresponding COVID-19-associated caseloads, morbidity, and mortality. Here, we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS Index; (2) present potential use cases to help policymakers and practitioners maximise the utility of the tool; (3) discuss the importance of scoring and ranking; (4) describe the robust methodology underpinning country scores and ranks; (5) highlight the GHS Index's emphasis on transparency and (6) articulate caveats for users wishing to use GHS Index data in health security research, policymaking and practice.